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ABSTRACT: 
In this paper we present a model of institutional reform in the European Union (EU). We focus on the 
introduction of the codecision procedure and its extension at the expense of the consultation 
procedure. In particular we develop a game-theoretical, spatial model of institutional choice and 
policy-making. First, the member states decide what procedures to apply to the policy issues under the 
EU’s authority. Next, they set policies under the procedures they chose. We present a perfect 
information model and thus do not rely on informational asymmetries to explain the reform. We argue 
that it is not so surprising that member states decide to give the European Parliament (EP) a 
meaningful role in the legislative process. The introduction and extension of codecision leads to a 
transfer of power from the Commission to the EP. As a result, member states that are closer to the EP 
on a policy issue than to the Commission prefer codecision on that issue rather than consultation. 
Large member states also prefer codecision, because their vote shares are larger in the EP. Codecision 
is introduced for a set of issues if all member states gain enough on some issues to compensate for 
their losses on other issues.  
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1. Introduction 
The European Union (EU) has gone through major changes during the past decades. The 
number of member states, the extent of its responsibilities, its democratic character, and its 
overall power have all increased. It became one of the most powerful political organizations 
in the world, although its citizens and others do not always perceive it as such. Citizens are 
often not aware that the EU’s decisions have a major impact on their everyday lives, and those 
who are aware question the democratic character of the EU.  
Crombez (2003) and others, however, highlighted that on average EU institutions are not less 
democratic than the institutions of its member states. One of the main drivers for a further 
democratization of the EU is the empowerment of an extra institution in addition to the 
intergovernmental Council, the directly elected European Parliament (EP).  
It is often considered as strange that member states give up part of their sovereignty to the EU, 
and even stranger that they created the EP, a supranational institution with veto and 
amendment rights, to colegislate with the Council. The handover of powers to the EU is still 
at the center of political discussions in member states and potential entrants. Some European 
countries, like Switzerland and Norway, do not even consider applying for EU membership. 
In the United Kingdom membership is questioned by a growing number of voters.  
The member states’ decision to give the EP a more important role in policy making at the EU 
level is even stranger in light of the conclusions reached by scholars of EU politics. Tsebelis 
(1994) pointed out that the codecision procedure, which empowers the EP, can increase the 
distance between the policy outcome and the member states’ ideal points. Steunenberg (1994) 
and Crombez (1996, 1997) highlighted the blocking powers of the EP under codecision. 
Crombez further emphasized the EP’s amendment rights. Furthermore, Schneider (1995) 
concluded that under codecision the EP and the Council can set a policy that is inferior for 
every member state, but that any change to this policy would be vetoed. This empowerment 
also impedes decision-making, and possibly decreases the powers of the member states. Häge 
(2011) concluded that the empowerment of the EP results in more politicized Council 
decision-making. Bureaucrats decide less on their own. Selck and Steunenberg (2004) found 
in their empirical analysis that the outcome of policy-making procedures was 
counterintuitively closer to the EP’s preferred policy under consultation than under codecision, 
but they argued that this is due to luck and to the fact that the EP is less extreme on issues 
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where it does not have veto power. For an overview of studies on the EP we refer to Hix, 
Raunio and Scully (2003). 
One of the most commonly offered explanations for the empowerment of the EP is that 
member states do not act completely rationally, but want to signal their support for European 
integration and reducing the so-called democratic deficit. One could think that Members of 
the EP (MEPs) vote according to their respective member state governments’ wishes. Noury 
and Roland (2002) and others, however, offer evidence for the supranational voting behavior 
of MEPs.  
Another explanation, offered by König (2008), is that member states endorse the 
empowerment of the EP, because under codecision the Commission no longer makes the 
proposal, but rather the EP does. The member states benefit from this shift, because the EP is 
less informed about the preferences of the member states than is the Commission. As a result 
member states can pretend that they are closer to the status quo than they really are, for 
example, if the EP and the Commission want to move further away from the status quo than 
does the Council, and obtain a policy that is closer to them than under consultation. The 
assumption that the EP is less informed than the Commission is not unrealistic because the 
Commission has a far more extensive staff. However, this does not explain why the 
Commission would not inform the EP about the Council’s true preferences, if the 
Commission and the EP have similar preferences.  
Steunenberg and Dimitrova (2003) concluded that member states take a variety of policy 
issues into account when they compare legislative procedures. They used power indices to 
analyze how member states decide what procedures to use, and empirically studied the areas 
to which codecision was extended by the Amsterdam Treaty. They used the expected benefit 
from the procedure as the determining factor for its extension.  
In our analysis we use spatial theory to explain that member states empower the EP and 
endorse a change from consultation to codecision. We first present a one-dimensional model 
with perfect and complete information. Next, we turn to a multidimensional policy space to 
broaden the argument. In contrast to König (2008), we do not use imperfect and asymmetric 
information as an explanation for the empowerment of the EP, but neither do we refute his 
claims. One may see our argument as complementing his rather than as a critique of it. We 
show that one does not need informational asymmetries to explain that member states vote in 
favor of codecision. 
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One may argue that member states do not have perfect and complete information, when they 
decide to introduce the codecision procedure. They do not know how the preferences of the 
Commission and the EP will evolve. We argue that the composition of both legislative bodies 
may vary, but that in the end the median is more or less stable over time. Contrary to König 
and Brauninger (1998), we do not assume that member states face uncertainty about the 
policies that will be voted on and the position of each of the political actors in the policy 
space. 
In the following section we present and discuss our one- and multi-dimensional models. The 
third section provides empirical evidence. The fourth section, finally, formulates our 
conclusions.  
 
2. Spatial Models of Institutional Reform and Policy Making 
We present onedimensional and multidimensional models of institutional reform and policy 
making in the EU. We first assume that the policy space is onedimensional. In reality, 
however, the policy space consists of a large number of dimensions, because a large number 
of issues are considered in policy making. Moreover, policy making may involve vote trading 
across different issues considered in a single legislative proposals, and across different 
legislative proposals. We are considering institutional choice in addition to policy making. At 
the institutional choice stage even more issues may be considered. Nonetheless 
onedimensional models can be useful as benchmark models. They are also more intuitive and 
analytically tractable.   
In our models the political actors have complete and perfect information about each other’s 
preferences and actions taken. The equilibrium concept is subgame perfection. 
 
2.1 A Onedimensional Model 
 
2.1.1 Actors and Preferences 
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The n member states are assumed to have Euclidean preferences over EU policy p, with ideal 
policy pi for member state i. For simplicity we assume that member state 1 has the lowest and 
member state n the highest ideal policy. 
Commissioners and MEPs also have Euclidean preferences. The Commission and the EP use 
simple majority. So they can be represented as unitary actors. Their median voters’ ideal 
policies, pp and pc, respectively, can be considered as their ideal policies. The Council is not 
represented as a unitary actor, because it votes by unanimity or qualified majority. Under 
unanimity rule the Council can be represented by its two most extreme member states.  When 
qualified majority voting is applied, it can be represented by two pivotal member states, one 
for a move to the left, the member state with the 255th vote from the left, and one for a move 
to the right, the member state with the 91st vote from the left.1  
A member state votes in favor of a policy proposal if the proposal is closer to its ideal policy 
than is the status quo. So, if the status quo is at zero, member state i with an ideal policy to the 
right of the status quo votes in favor of a proposal p if p is in its acceptance set [0,2pi].   
 
2.1.2 The Sequence of Events 
The model starts with an institutional choice stage. In particular the Council votes on the 
procedure that will be used: the consultation procedure or the codecision procedure. The 
introduction of codecision requires unanimity. In the absence of unanimity the consultation 
procedure continues to be used. Then this stage is followed by the policy making stages. To 
model these stages we use the models of the consultation and codecision procedures presented 
by Crombez (1996, 1997, 2000). We want to investigate under which conditions the Council 
members approve the use of the codecision procedure. What are their reasons for doing so and 
do they anticipate enlargements? Why would large member states vote in favor of the 
codecision procedure? Why would moderate member states vote in favor (König 2008)? 
If the Council, in the first stage, chooses to apply consultation, then the Commission comes 
up with a proposal in the second stage. The Commission is the only institution that can initiate 
legislation, but it has to respond to requests for a proposal by the Council or the EP. In the 
third stage, member state 1 can amend the proposal. For simplicity we assume only one 
member state can amend the proposal, just like in Crombez’s earlier work (1996, 1997, 2000). 
The Council votes on this amendment by unanimity in the fourth stage. If the amendment is 
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adopted, it becomes EU policy. If it is not adopted or no amendment was made, the Council 
votes on the original proposal by qualified majority in the fifth stage. If the proposal is 
adopted, it becomes EU policy. Otherwise, the status quo prevails. 
If the Council decides to apply codecision in the first stage, it is also up to the Commission to 
come up with a proposal in the second stage. Again the Commission has monopoly proposal 
power but no gatekeeping power. In the third stage, similarly to the consultation procedure, 
only one member state can propose an amendment. In the fourth stage the Council votes on 
the amendment by unanimity. If the amendment is adopted, the process moves on to the sixth 
stage. If no amendment is proposed or approved, the Council votes on the Commission’s 
proposal in the fifth stage. If a qualified majority approves the proposal, it becomes the 
common position and the process moves on to the sixth stage. Otherwise the status quo 
prevails. In the sixth stage the EP proposes a joint text in the Conciliation Committee. If the 
Council approves the joint text by qualified majority and the EP by simple majority in the 
seventh and eighth stages, the joint text becomes the EU policy. Otherwise the status quo 
prevails. 
In reality member states can also propose joint texts in the Conciliation Committee. Thomson 
et al. (2006) tested the predictive power of the different type of models, however, and 
concluded that spatial models that give the EP the bargaining power in the Conciliation 
Committee do best in empirical studies. This suggests that it is reasonable to assume that the 
EP makes the proposal in the Conciliation Committee, as we do.  
 
2.1.3 The Policy Making Equilibrium Under Consultation 
If in the first stage the member states decide to apply consultation, the second stage will be as 
follows. The Commission wants the policy as close as possible to its ideal policy, but this 
does not necessarily mean that it proposes its own ideal policy. It will anticipate what policies 
will be approved. The Commission knows that if its proposal can be amended by unanimity, it 
will possibly get an outcome that is further away than the outcome it would get if it proposed 
a policy that could not be amended by a unanimous Council and could be approved by a 
qualified majority in the Council. So, the Commission proposes, for example, the ideal policy 
of the most conservative member state, that is, the member state closest to the status quo, if all 
member states are right of the status quo, and the Commission is left of the most conservative 
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member state. Thus in later stages the Council cannot amend and approves the proposal by 
qualified majority. 
In general the Commission looks ahead at the last stage of the process. In that stage the 
Commission proposal is approved if a qualified majority prefers it to the status quo. 
Otherwise the status quo prevails. In the third and fourth stages a proposal that would be 
adopted in the last stage is successfully amended if it does not belong to the support of the 
member states’ ideal policies, that is, if all member states want to move to the left (or right). 
For these reasons the Commission proposes a policy in the second stage that is preferred to 
the status quo by a qualified majority and belongs to the support of the member states’ ideal 
policies.    
The equilibrium policy under the consultation procedure will be as follows. The set CS of 
proposals that can be adopted under consultation is the set of policies that are preferred to the 
status quo by a qualified majority in the Council and belong to the support of the member 
states’ ideal policies, meaning that there is no policy preferred to it by all member states. 
From this set the Commission proposes the policy that is closest to its own ideal policy. 
 
2.1.4 The Policy Making Equilibrium Under Codecision 
As already mentioned, the Commission, the EP and the member states think ahead and take 
into account what will happen in later stages. So, we use backward induction to find the 
subgame perfect equilibrium.  
In the last two stages the Council and the EP consider the joint text. The member states and 
the EP vote in favor if they prefer it to the status quo. Otherwise the status quo prevails. 
Therefore the EP proposes a joint text in the sixth stage that is preferred to the status quo by 
the EP and a qualified majority in the Council. In particular it proposes the policy it prefers 
most from among those policies. Note that no other policies are preferred to this proposal by a 
qualified majority in the Council and the EP.  
In the sixth stage the EP proposes the common position as a joint text, only if it is preferred to 
the status quo by the EP and a qualified majority, and no other such policy is preferred to it by 
the EP. Otherwise it proposes a different policy, the policy that satisfies these requirements. In 
the stages two through five the Commission and the member states are thus aware that no 
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policy can be adopted other than this optimal EP joint text. Since the Commission does not 
have gatekeeping rights and a qualified majority prefers the joint text to the status quo, the 
joint text becomes EU policy. Stages two through five are thus irrelevant.  
So, the equilibrium policy under codecision is the most preferred policy of the EP in the set 
CD of proposals that are preferred to the status quo by the EP and a qualified majority in the 
Council, and to which no other policies are preferred by both the EP and a qualified majority 
in the Council. 
The codecision procedure has changed over time. Compared to the old codecision procedure, 
which was used till 1999, the EP rather than the Commission now chooses the policy that gets 
adopted from the set CD. However, in practice the former codecision procedure always 
worked in the same way as the current codecision procedure, because the EP set as an internal 
rule that if the Council confirmed its common position rather than the joint text, the EP would 
automatically reject it. 
 
2.1.5 The Institutional Choice Equilibrium 
In the first stage the member states compare the equilibrium policies of the codecision and 
consultation procedures, and decide whether to empower the EP or not. Thus the Council only 
empowers the EP if each member state gets at least the same utility under codecision as under 
consultation. The member states compare the Commission’s proposal under consultation, 
which is preferred to the status quo by a qualified majority and to which no other such policy 
is preferred by all member states, with the EP’s joint text, which is also preferred to the status 
quo by a qualified majority in the Council and to which no other such policy is preferred by 
the EP. Under consultation the Commission choses the equilibrium policy, whereas uner 
codecision the EP does. 
Under both procedures the equilibrium policy is preferred to the status quo by a qualified 
majority. Moreover, no such policy is preferred to the equilibrium policy under consultation 
by all member states. So, all member states will only approve introducing codecision if it 
leads to the same policy, that is, if the equilibrium policy under consultation is equal to the 
equilibrium policy under codecision. Member states may then support codecision to give the 
impression that they are supporting further democratization of the EU.  
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Both equilibrium policies are the same in three scenarios: (1) if the Commission and the EP 
have the same ideal policy; (2) if the Commission and EP both have ideal policies to the left 
of the set CS, that is, they want to move in the opposite direction than the pivotal member 
states or are to the left of all member states; and (3) if the Commission and EP are both to the 
right of the set CS, that is, they both want to move farther away from the status quo than the 
pivotal member state is willing to accept or than all member states. We assume in the above 
statement that the pivotal member states are to the right of the status quo. If they are to the left, 
the opposite holds. If the status quo is between the pivotal member states, the status quo 
prevails whatever procedure is used. 
For example, in case the EP wants to move less far in a direction than the pivotal member 
states and the Commission wants to move farther in that direction than the member state that 
is pivotal for this move, then the more progressive member states will oppose the 
empowerment of the EP in the first stage, because the policy will be closer to the status quo 
than under consultation. So consultation will prevail. 
For the mathematical derivation of the equilibria we refer to the appendix. 
 
2.2 The Impact of Member State Preferences 
In this section we discuss how the preferences of member states influence their attitudes 
toward codecision. We assume for simplicity that the status quo is equal to 0, and that the 
pivotal member states want to move to the right, away from the status quo. We assume 
furthermore that member state 1’s ideal policy is equal to the status quo, and member state n’s 
ideal policy is equal to the policy 2pa that makes member state a indifferent to the status quo, 
where a is the member state that is pivotal for a move to the right. As a consequence a 
qualified majority agrees to move away from the status quo under both procedures, and no 
proposal it agrees on can be amended in the Council. So, the interval QM of policies that can 
be approved by a qualified majority in the Council is equal to the set [0,2pa].  
We now analyze how the introduction of codecision affects the equilibrium policy and how 
this impact depends on the configuration of preferences. We first see what happens if the 
Commission is in the set QM. 
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• If the Commission has the same ideal policy as the EP, the equilibrium policy is the 
same under both procedures. Member states are then indifferent between the two 
procedures. 
• Otherwise, the equilibrium policy (weakly) moves into the direction of the EP. 
Codecision is then preferred by the following member states. 
o Member states closer to the EP than to the Commission, if the EP is also in the 
set QM. 
o Member states closer to 2pa than to the Commission, if pp > 2pa.  
o Member states closer to 0 than to the Commission, if pp < 0.  
Next, we study what happens if the Commission is not in the set QM. 
• If the Commission is to the left of the set QM, pc < 0, the following member states 
prefer codecision. 
o Member states closer to the EP than to the status quo, if the EP is in the set 
QM.  
o Member states closer to 2pa than to the status quo, if pp > 2pa.  
o Otherwise the equilibrium policy is the same under both procedures and 
member states are indifferent.  
• If the Commission is to the right of the set QM, pc > 2pa, the following member states 
prefer codecision. 
o Member states closer to the EP than to 2pa, if the EP is in the set QM. 
o Member states closer to 0 than to 2pa, if pp < 0.  
o Otherwise the equilibrium policy is the same under both procedures and 
member states are indifferent.  
So, the Commission and the EP both have a ‘corrected’ ideal policy, their most preferred 
policies in the set QM, which they will chose as proposals, under consultation and codecision 
respectively. These corrected ideal policies are equal to their ideal policies if it they are in the 
set QM. They are equal to 0 if they are left of this set, and to policy 2pa if they are right of the 
set. The member states closer to the EP’s corrected policy than to the Commission’s prefer 
codecision to consultation. The farther a member state is away from the midpoint between the 
corrected ideal policies of the Commission and the EP, the more outspoken its preferences are. 
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2.3 A Multidimensional Model 
In our multidimensional model member states first chose for what dimensions to introduce 
codecision. They then set policies on the issues under the EU’s jurisdiction in a sequential 
matter. The institutional choice is made during the first two stages of the process. In the first 
stage member state 𝑘 ∈ {1,… ,𝑛} proposes which subset 𝐸 ⊆ 𝐷 of dimensions to decide under 
codecision. In the second stage the n member states vote on this proposal. If they all agree, the 
set E of dimensions is moved to codecision. Otherwise, all dimensions remain under 
consultation. In reality other member states could formulate proposals or amendments, but our 
assumption that only one member state has proposal rights at the institutional choice stage 
does not affect our conclusions. 
After making an institutional choice, member states move on and set policies on each of the m 
dimensions under consideration sequentially. Since the member states, Commissioners and 
MEPs have Euclidean preferences, policy making on a given dimension can be studied as if it 
were the only dimension. Policy making in our multidimensional model is thus as in our 
onedimensional model. 
As in our onedimensional model political actors have complete and perfect information. The 
equilibrium concept is thus subgame perfection. 
Since approval by all member states is required in the second stage, codecision is introduced 
for a subset E of dimensions, only if all member states are better off as a result of this change. 
In the first stage member state k considers what subsets can be approved by all member states 
and proposes the subset that maximizes its own utility. 
So, overall the move of a set of policies from consultation to codecision must benefit all 
member states. Member states may prefer consultation for some issues in the set E, but their 
decreases in utility as a result of the introduction of codecision on these dimensions must be 
outweighed by their utility gains on the other dimensions in the set E. Otherwise, they would 
not approve the institutional change and it would not occur.  
Instead of comparing consultation and codecision separately for each policy dimension, 
member states compare their total utilities under the consultation procedure to their total 
utilities under codecision. So, even if a member state loses on one dimension, it can be 
compensated on another dimension. Member states accept losses in a policy domain if they 
are compensated in other domains. In fact, this can be seen as vote trading during the 
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institutional choice stages. We assume that all dimensions are equally valued. One may argue 
that in reality member states allocate weights to the different dimensions, but we abstract from 
this, because we do not need this to make our point. 
To illustrate the institutional choice, we now turn to an example. There are policy dimensions. 
All political actors are located to the right of the status quo on each dimension.  For simplicity, 
we use only seven member states in our example. On dimension 1 the member states are 
ranked from one to seven, and member state 1 is the most conservative, whereas member state 
7 is the most progressive. We set the status quo equal to zero and the member states are 
located at positions one to seven. The Commission is assumed to have preferences equal to 
the most conservative member state. The EP is assumed to have preferences equal to the most 
progressive member state. All the assumptions are the same for the second policy area, 
dimension 2, but the configuration of the member states’ preferences is the opposite: member 
state 7 is now at position 1 and member state 1 at position 7. We assume that a qualified 
majority requires a majority of five out of seven. As a consequence, member states 3 and 5 are 
the pivotal member states.  
 
-Figure 1 about here- 
 
The set of policies in dimension 1 that are preferred to the status quo under codecision by a 
qualified majority in the Council and the EP and that cannot be amended by a qualified 
majority in the Council and the EP ranges from the preferred policy of member state 3 to the 
preferred policy of member state 6. Member state 6’s ideal policy makes pivotal member state 
3 indifferent to the status quo. This set is smaller than the set of policies that can be adopted 
under consultation, because under consultation a unanimous Council is required to amend a 
proposal. Another difference between consultation and codecision is that under consultation 
the Commission defines the proposal whereas under codecision the EP does. This results in an 
equilibrium policy under consultation equal to 1 and an equilibrium policy under codecision 
equal to 6.  
On policy dimension 2 the equilibrium policies are the same, but the order of the member 
states is reversed. We now calculate the utilities of the member states and their total gains 
from changing from consultation to codecision. If all member states have at least the same 
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utility than before and there are member states that gain from this change, member states will 
approve codecision. The utilities are shown in Table 1. All member states gain in utility and 
as a consequence will endorse the introduction of codecision on both dimensions. 
 
-Table 1 about here- 
 
In general one can expect issues for which a move to codecision yields high total utility gains 
for member states to be included in the set E. Not every member state needs to gain from the 
move on every issue, but if it loses out on an issue, its gains on another issue need to be high 
enough to compensate for its losses. As seen above member states gain from the introduction 
of codecision on an issue, if they are closer to the (corrected) ideal policy of the EP than to 
that of the Commission. One can thus expect issues on which member states are relatively 
close to the EP to be included in the set E.  
 
PROPOSITION 1 
Member states that are relatively close to the EP on a policy issue favor the introduction of 
codecision on that issue. Codecision is introduced for an issue if the EP is relatively close to 
the member states on that issue. 
 
When codecision is introduced on a policy issue, the role of agenda setter is transferred from 
the Commission to the EP. The question why member states empower the EP is then arguably 
the wrong question, or at a minimum it is misleading. The member states do not relinquish 
power to the EP, when they introduce codecision on an issue, but rather they shift power from 
the Commission to the EP. If as a result of such a shift equilibrium policies in the different 
dimensions are more central than under consultation, as they are in Figure 1, member states 
will gain overall. 
Since large member states are better represented in the EP than they are in the Commission, 
they can be expected to be closer to the EP than they are to the Commission. As a result large 
member states can be expected to be more in favor of codecision than are small member states. 
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3 A First Step Toward An Empirical Test 
Our goal is to test our theory’s conclusions empirically, focusing on the extension of 
codecision in the Lisbon Treaty. Specifically we want to test whether member states that were 
relatively close to the EP on an issue did indeed favor the introduction of codecision on that 
issue. Furthermore we want to study whether codecision was indeed introduced for issues on 
which the EP was relatively close to the member states on average.  
Such tests require information on the location of member states and institutions on issues that 
were moved to codecision as well as on issues that remained under consultation. At this point 
in our study we have not gathered and analyzed this information. We will, however, formulate 
preliminary conclusions based on data on member states’ and institutions’ opinions on the 
introduction of codecision, gathered as part of the DOSEI project.2 
In appendix B we provide a list of issues to which the consultation procedure still applies 
post-Lisbon and a list of issues that moved from consultation to codecision after the approval 
of the Lisbon Treaty.  Some of the issues that remain under consultation seem very specific 
and technical, such as the language arrangements for intellectual property rights, but other 
issues are politically more controversial, such as tax, employment and monetary policy issues. 
The DOSEI project determined the member states’ and institutions’ positions on the 
introduction of codecision in twelve policy areas: agriculture, cohesion, security and justice, 
taxes, the internal market, employment, social security, monetary, economic, social, foreign, 
and defense policy. In all policy areas the introduction of codecision was opposed by at least 
three member states, and by usually more. The introduction thus would not have occurred in 
any policy area, if it had been considered in isolation.  
Nonetheless codecision was extended to more than an extra fifty policy areas. This suggests 
that a large subset of issues was found such that all member states benefited from the 
introduction of codecision to them. The areas in which the introduction was opposed by the 
highest numbers of member states, foreign and defense policy, taxes and social security, and 
economic and monetary policy, are precisely those areas in which codecision was hardly or 
not at all introduced. This suggests that the utility losses that would result from the 
15	  
	  
introduction of codecision on these issues for the opposing member states would have been to 
great to compensate them by the introduction of codecision on other issues.  
It is worth noting that there was a remarkable confluence between the preferences of Germany 
and the eventual outcome. The policy areas where Germany opposed the introduction of 
codecision mainly stayed under consultation: foreign, defense, monetary, economic and 
employment policy.  
The data further show that in most policy areas the Commission and the EP have similar 
preferences. In these areas the introduction of codecision does not represent any cost to 
member states in a perfect information world. Therefore member states may feel inclined to 
empower the EP on issues that do not require much technical knowledge, whereas on other 
issues that require this kind of knowledge, consultation may be preferable.   
 
4 Discussion and Conclusion 
In the analysis above we discussed the existing explanations for the extension of codecision at 
the expense of consultation, and presented our own theory. One of the earlier arguments was 
that the EU wanted to increase its credibility and decrease the democratic deficit, and that the 
member states therefore did not act completely rationally when empowering the EP. Another 
explanation was that due to informational asymmetry the Council could benefit from 
codecision, given the right configuration of preferences.  
Like Steunenberg and Dimitrova (2003) we argued that member states take into account the 
issues that will be voted on using the new procedure and the preferences of all the political 
actors on these issues, when they vote on whether to extend codecision to a set of policy areas. 
They compare the benefits from the extension of the use of the procedure to the losses.  
We find that there are configurations of preferences on different policy dimensions for which 
it is optimal for all member states to endorse codecision to be applied in all these dimensions, 
because there are gains from trade. This means that each member state wins more on certain 
policy issues than it loses on others. As a consequence we argue that one does not need 
imperfect information or kindhearted behavior to explain why member states empower the EP, 
but there is a simple explanation based on selfishness.  
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We conclude that member states do not surrender powers to the EP when they introduce 
codecision, but rather they transfer powers from the Commission to the EP. Member states 
with preferences relatively close to those of the EP on an issue thus favor the introduction of 
codecision on that issue, whereas member states with preferences relatively close to those of 
the Commission oppose it. Codecision is extended to issues on which the EP is relatively 
close to the member states on average. 
We further argue that large member states tend to be more in favor of codecision than small 
member states. This is due to the fact that large member states are underrepresented in the 
Commission.  
In our first steps toward empirically testing our theory we present some observations that are 
consistent with it. This paper is certainly not the endpoint of our research on the institutional 
choice that precedes EU policy making.  
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QM:  Set of policies that are preferred to the status quo by a QM in the Council 
AMCS:  Set of policies that cannot be amended by a unanimous Council 
AMCD:  Set of policies that cannot be amended by a QM in the Council and the EP 
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EP and that cannot be amended by a QM in the Council and the EP 𝑝!"∗ : Equilibrium policy under consultation 𝑝!"∗ : Equilibrium policy under codecision 
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Table 1: 
Dimension 1 
Member state 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
U(CS) 0 -1 -4 -9 -16 -25 -36 
U(CD) -25 -16 -9 -4 -1 0 -1 
U(CD) - U(CS) -25 -15 -5 5 15 25 35 
 
Dimension 2 
Member state 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
U(CS) -36 -25 -16 -9 -4 -1 0 
U(CD) -1 0 -1 -4 -9 -16 -25 
U(CD) - U(CS) 35 25 15 5 -5 -15 -25 
 
Total gain of utility over both dimensions 
Member state 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Gain Dim. 1 -25 -15 -5 5 15 25 35 
Gain Dim. 2 35 25 15 5 -5 -15 -25 
Sum of gains 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
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Appendix A 
The Model 
• The policy space nP ℜ⊆  consist of n dimensions, each corresponding to a policy 
issue. 
• The political actors are: the member states in the Council; the MEPs; and the 
Commissioners. 
• They have Euclidean preferences over EU policy PpEU ∈ . That is, actor j has the 
following utility function: 2)()( EUj
EU
j pxpU −−= , where Px j ∈  is actor j’s ideal 
policy.  
• We consider two different stages: the institutional stage and the legislative stage or 
legislative process, consisting of multiples stages itself. 
• In the legislative process the n policy issues are considered one at a time. The 
European Parliament (EP) uses simple majority rule and can thus be represented as a 
unitary actor in the legislative process with ideal policy iEPx  on dimension i equal to 
the ideal policy of the median MEP on that dimension, i∀ . See Black (1958). 
• Similarly, the Commission can be represented as a unitary actor with ideal policy iCx  
on dimension i.  
• The Council uses qualified majority rule (255/345 votes) or unanimity. Under 
qualified majority rule the member state ai that is pivotal for a move to the right on 
dimension i is the member state with the 91st vote from the left. Member state bi is 
pivotal for a move to the left on dimension i. It is the member state with the 255th vote 
from the left. Under unanimity the member state 1i  that is most to the left on 
dimension i is pivotal for a move to the right, whereas the member state mi that is most 
to the right on dimension i is pivotal for a move to the left. 
• We assume for simplicity and without loss of generality that the status quo 0=q , and 
that there is no qualified majority in favor of a move to the left on any dimension 
( 0≥ibix ). So, we consider rightward moves only. 
• The structure of the institutional process is as follows. 
1. During negotiations between all EU member states the policy domains and 
their respective necessary majorities and decision rules are discussed. 
2. These arrangements are officialised and written down in Treaties. Treaties are 
approved by unanimity of all member states. 
3. A vote on the specific treaty is held. Actor j can vote yes (=1) or no (=0):
}1,0{)( ∈mcv j . 
• The structure of the legislative process is as follows: the n issues are considered 
sequentially: 1,…,n. 
• The structure of the legislative process on issue i is as follows. 
1. Under Consultation 
1. The Commission C makes a policy proposal ipp . 
2. The member states vote on the proposal. It is approved by qualified 
majority, otherwise the status quo prevails. 
 
2. Under Codecision 
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1. The Commission C makes a policy proposal ipp . 
2. Member State k can come up with an amendment 
3. The Council votes on the amendment by unanimity. If the 
amendment is adopted, we move on to point 5. 
4. If no amendment is proposed or approved, the Council votes on the 
Commission’s proposal. If approved by a QM in the Council the 
proposal becomes the common position and the process moves 
forward. Otherwise the status quo prevails. 
5. The EP proposes a joint text in the Conciliation Committee and the 
Committee votes on it by simple majority for the representatives of 
the EU and qualified majority for the member states. If the 
Conciliation Committee fails to agree upon a joint text, the status 
quo prevails 
6. The EP and the member states vote on the proposal. If the EP and a 
qualified majority in the Council approve the proposal, it is adopted. 
Otherwise, the status quo prevails. 
• There is complete and perfect information. 
• The equilibrium concept is subgame perfection. 
 
The Equilibrium in the Legislative Process on Issue i 
 
• Under consultation  
1. At the vote stage member state k votes in favor of the proposed policy ppi if 
and only if it is closer to its ideal policy ikx  than is the status quo. That is, if 
and only if ik
ii
k
ii
k
i
k xqxppqUppU −≤−⇔≥ |||)()( |. Otherwise it votes 
against. 
2. At the proposal stage the Commission considers the member states’ voting 
strategies.  
§ If member state 1i does not want to move to the right ( 0
1
<iix ), no 
policy is preferred to the status quo by a unanimous Council, and the 
status quo prevails. The Commission then proposes the status quo.  
§ If member state 1i does want to move to the right ( 0
1
≥iix ), the 
Commission’s proposal is approved if and only if member state ai 
prefers it to the status quo. That is, if and only if 
].2,0[||||)()( iiiii a
ii
a
ii
a
ii
a
i
a xppxqxppqUppU ∈⇔−≤−⇔≥  The 
Commission then proposes the policy in the set ]2,0[ ia
i xCSQ =  it 
prefers most. Its optimal proposal strategy is then as follows. If its ideal 
policy is left of the status quo ( 0<iCx ), it proposes the status quo 
)0( =ipp . If its ideal policy is right of the policy ix12  that makes 
member state ai indifferent to the status quo, it proposes policy ix12 . 
Otherwise it proposes its ideal policy iCx . 
3. The Commission proposal is adopted and becomes EU policy icsp . 
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• Under codecision 
1. When considering the Conciliation Committee’s joint text in the last stage of 
the process actor j (member state k and the EP) votes in favor of the proposed 
policy cci if and only if it is closer to its ideal policy ijx  than is the status quo. 
That is, if and only if ij
ii
j
ii
j
i
j xqxppqUppU −≤−⇔≥ |||)()( |. Otherwise it 
votes against. 
2. A joint text thus is adopted in the last stage only under the following 
conditions. 
§ If either member state ai or the EP does not want to move to the right 
( 0},min{ <ia
i
EP ii xx ), no policy is preferred to the status quo by the EP 
and a qualified majority in the Council. No policy is then adopted at the 
last stage and the status quo prevails.   
§ If member state ai and the EP both do want to move to the right 
( 0},min{ ≥ia
i
EP ii xx ), the Commission’s proposal is approved if and 
only if member state ai and the EP prefer it to the status quo. That is, if 
and only if }].22min{,0[ ia
i
EP
i
ii xxpp ∈   
3. Suppose now the Commission proposal would differ from the EP’s proposal. 
§ The EP compares it with its ideal policy from the set of policies that are 
preferred to the status quo by a qualified majority of countries and the 
EP and that cannot be amended. If the Commission proposal differs 
from that policy, it would always reshape the proposal in the 
Conciliation Committee. 
§ While shaping this proposal in the Conciliation Committee, the EP 
considers the member states voting strategies. 
• If member state ai or the EP does not want to move to the right 
of the proposal, and member state bi or the EP does not want to 
move to the left ( }],max{},,[min{ ib
i
EP
i
a
i
EP
i
iii xxxxpp ∈ ), the EP 
proposes the same policy as the Commission would. 
• If member state ai and the EP want to move to the right, the EP 
proposes its ideal policy if member state ai prefers it to the 
status quo ( i
a
ii
a
i
EP ii xqxx −≤− ||| |). Otherwise it proposes the 
policy ii
a cx i −2  that makes member state  a
i indifferent to the 
status quo as a joint text. Note that this joint text belongs to the 
set }],max{},,[min{ ib
i
EP
i
a
i
EP iii xxxx  and to the set 
}].22min{,0[ ia
i
EP ii xx  
• If member state bi and the EP want to move to the left, the EP 
proposes its ideal policy if member state bi prefers it to the 
status quo ( i
b
ii
b
i
EP ii xqxx −≤− ||| |). Otherwise it proposes the 
policy ii
b qx i −2  that makes member state b
i indifferent to the 
status quo as a joint text. Note again that this joint text belongs 
to the set }],max{},,[min{ ib
i
EP
i
a
i
EP iii xxxx  and to the set 
}].22min{,0[ ia
i
EP ii xx  
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4. For a proposal to be adopted and not to be amended it thus needs to belong to 
the set }}],max{2,2min{,[
1
i
b
i
EP
i
a
i
EP
ii
iii xxxxxCD =  with 0},min{ ≥ia
i
EP ii xx . If 
0},min{ <ia
i
EP ii xx , the status quo prevails whatever policy is proposed. 
5. Even if the Commission proposes a policy that does not belong to the set CDi , 
EU policy will belong to that set. 
6. The Commission then proposes the policy in the set iCD  the EP prefers most, 
because it anticipates the agenda setting power of the EP in the Conciliation 
Committee. Its optimal proposal strategy is then as follows. The Commission 
proposal is adopted and becomes EU policy icdp . 
 
The Equilibrium in the Legislative Process 
• Under each procedure the equilibrium EU legislative program consists of the 
equilibrium policy on each dimension. For example, under codecision the equilibrium 
policy ),...,( 1 ncdcdcd ppp = . The set of programs the Commission can successfully 
propose under codecision is then the set }}.,...,1{,{ niCDppCD ii ∈∀∈= ξ   
 
The Equilibrium in the Institutional Stage 
Member states vote in favor of codecision on a package of issues and policy areas, only if 
their total utility is better compared to consultation. This total utility can be seen as the sum of 
utilities a member states receives from each of the policy dimensions. 
That is, a country i will approve a package of n policy dimensions k.  
2
11
2
11
)()()()( kcsi
n
k
k
csi
n
k
k
cdi
n
k
k
cdi
n
k
pxpUpxpU −−=≥−−= ∑∑∑∑
====
	  
So,  a transfer of policies from consultation to codecision will be approved if: 
2
11
2
11
)()()()(:}27,...,1{ kcsi
n
k
k
csi
n
k
k
cdi
n
k
k
cdi
n
k
pxpUpxpUi −−=≥−−=∈∀ ∑∑∑∑
====
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Appendix B 
List of Issues to Which the Consultation Procedure Applies 
The legal bases are the articles in the consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union (TFEU), unless indicated otherwise. (UN = unanimity, SM = simple 
majority.) 
Issue Legal Bases UN SM 
Free movement & Social Protection 21.3 ü  
Participation in Elections 22.1, 22.2 ü  
Diplomatic Help 23   
Union Law liberalization of capital movement 
to/from a third country 
64 ü  
Measures for administrative cooperation on freedom, 
security and justice 
74   
Provisions related to passports, ID-cards… 77.3 ü  
Provisional measures for acute migration of citizens 
from a third nation to a member state 
78.3   
Family law; cross border 81.3 ü  
Specific measures for cooperation in police issues 87.3 ü  
Operations of authorities of member state in other 
member states 
89 ü  
Transport rate differences of carriers 95.3   
Directives and regulations for principles of 
competition 
103.1   
Regulations concerning state aid and competition and 
internal trade distortion 
109   
Provisions for harmonization of turnover taxes … 
(Internal Market) 
113 ü  
Directives for the approximations of laws … affecting 
internal market 
115 ü  
Language of IP-rights 118 ü  
European institutions’ access to credit 125.   
Government deficits 126.14 ü  
Supervision by ECB 127.6 ü  
Euro banknotes and coins 128.2   
ESBC ECB 129.4   
Progress in Member States’ obligations 140.2   
Guidelines employment policies 148.2   
Establish an employment committee --> coordination 
labor markets 
150  ü 
Employment: specific issues 153.2 ü  
Establish social protection committee 160  ü 
Specific programmes activities EU 182.4   
Set up undertakings for research (programs) 188   
Environmental issues: town/country planning, water 
resource management, land use provision of fiscal 
nature 
192.2 ü  
26	  
	  
Establish measures of fiscal nature in environmental 
issues 
194.3 ü  
provisions of public health, security or policy, 
freedom of movement 
203 ü  
Reciprocal rights/obligations tourism in specific cases 218.6b   
Exchange rate 219.1 ü  
Replacement of member of commission due to 
compulsory retirement or death 
246 (ü)  
Provision to confer jurisdiction regarding IP rights 262 ü  
ECB executive board members 283.2   
Adopt members of Court of Auditors 286.2   
European investment bank Statute adaptation 308 ü  
Provisions for  the system of own resources 311 ü  
Determination of methods and procedure budget 
revenue --> available to Commission 
322.2   
Costs of implementation of enhanced cooperation 
expenditures and administrative costs  
332 ü  
Adopt a decision that it will act under the ordinary 
legislative procedure 
333.2 ü  
Application of treaties to remote areas 349   
Establishment organization and functioning of 
European External Action Service 
27.3 (TEU)   
Decision establishing specific procedures for 
guaranteeing rapid access to appropriations in the 
Union budget for urgent financing for common 
foreign and security policy 
41.3 (TEU) 
 
  
Ordinary revision procedures: decision in favor of 
examining the proposed amendments of treaties 
48.3 (TEU)  ü 
Simplified revision procedures: monetary area 48.6 (TEU)   
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Legal Bases Moved from Consultation to Codecision following the Treaty of Lisbon 
The legal bases are the respective articles in the consolidated version of the TFEU. 
Issue Legal Bases 
Services of general economic interest 14 
Citizens' initiative 24 
Application of competition rules to the common agricultural policy 42 
Legislation concerning the common agricultural policy 43 
Exclusion in a Member State of certain activities from the application of 
provisions on the right of establishment 
51 
Extending provisions on freedom to provide services to service providers 
who are 
nationals of a third State and who are established within the Union 
56 
Liberalization of services in specific sectors 59 
Adoption of other measures on the movement of capital to and from third 
countries 
64.2 
Administrative measures relating to capital movements in connection with 
preventing and combating crime and terrorism 
75 
Visas, border checks, free movement of nationals of non-member countries, 
management of external frontiers, absence of controls at internal frontiers 
77.2 
Asylum, temporary protection or subsidiary protection for nationals of third 
countries 
78.2 
Immigration and combating trafficking in persons 79.2 
Incentive measures for the integration of nationals of third countries 79.4 
Judicial cooperation in civil matters (excluding family law) 81 
Judicial cooperation in criminal matters – procedures, cooperation, training, 
settlement of conflicts, minimum rules for recognition of judgments 
82.1; 82.2 
Minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences and sanctions 
in the areas of particularly serious crime with a cross-border dimension 
83.1; 83.2 
Measures to support crime prevention 84 
Eurojust 85.1.2 
Arrangements for involving the European Parliament and national 
parliaments in the evaluation of Eurojust's activities 
85.1.3 
Police cooperation 87.2 
Europol 88.2.1 
Procedures for scrutiny of Europol's activities by EP and national 
parliaments 
88.2.2 
Measures to eliminate distortions in the internal market 116 
Intellectual property except language arrangements for the European 
intellectual 
property rights 
118 
Multilateral surveillance 121.6 
Modification of the Protocol on the Statutes of the ESCB and ECB 129.3 
Measures necessary for the use of the euro 133 
Sport 165.2; 165.4 
Public health 168.4 
Public health – incentive measures to protect human health and in particular 
to combat the major cross-border health scourges, and measures to tackle 
168.5 
28	  
	  
tobacco and alcohol abuse 
Cohesion Fund 177.2 
Implementation of European research area 182.5 
Implementation of the Framework Programme for Research: rules for the 
participation of undertakings and dissemination of research results 
183.2; 188.2 
Space policy 189 
Energy, excluding measures of a fiscal nature 194.2 
Tourism - measures to complement the action of the Member States in the 
tourism sector 
195.2 
Civil protection against natural and man-made disasters 196.2 
Administrative cooperation in implementing Union law by Member States 197.2 
Commercial policy - implementing measures 207.2 
Economic, financial and technical cooperation with third countries 212.2 
General framework for humanitarian operations 214.3 
European Voluntary Humanitarian Aid Corps 214.5 
Creation of specialised courts 257 
Modification of Statute of Court of Justice 281 
Procedures for monitoring the exercise of implementing powers 291.3 
European Administration 298.2 
Adoption of financial rules 322.1 
Staff Regulations of officials and Conditions of Employment of Other 
Servants of the Union 
336 
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1	  A qualified majority currently consists of 255 out of a total of 345 votes. Moreover, support from a majority of 
2 	  For more information on the DOSEI project we refer to its website: “http://www2.sowi.uni-
mannheim.de/lspol2/dosei/”. See also König and Hug (2006). 
	  
